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442 MALONEY v. RATH [69 C.2d 
[8. F. No. 22596. In Bank. Oct. 7,1968.] 
KATHLEEN MALONEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. 
RAMONA M. RATH, Defendant and Respondent. 
[la-Ie] Automobiles-Operation-Care--Defects in Brakes: Pre-
sumptions.-A defendant's failure to comply with Veh. Code, 
§§ 26300, 26453, 26454, relating to the maintenance of a ve-
hicle's braking equipment, gives rise to a presumption of his 
negligence, and, although he may rebut the presumption by 
proof that he did what might reasonably be expected of a 
person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circum-
stances, who desired to comply with the law, the statutes 
recognize that improper maintenance threatens a grave risk of 
serious bodily harm and death, thus rendering the statutory 
duty nondelegable. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Operation-Defects in Brakes: Defenses: Sufficiency 
of Evidence--Defective Equipment.-In an action for damages 
for injuries incurred in an automobile accident caused by the 
failure of defendant's brakes, it was no defense that she 
rebutted the presumption of her own negligence by showing 
that the brakes had been overhauled three months before the 
accident, that the car had been inspected for damage after an 
intervening accident, that the brakes gave no warning of their 
impending failure and that the defects would be apparent only 
to a mechanic, where it was undisputed that the brake failure 
resulted from the negligence of the gas station with which she 
had contracted to perform the overhaul and inspection. 
[3] Id.-Operation-Care--Persons Liable--Strict Liability-Vio-
lation of Safety Provision of Code.-A violation of a safety 
provision of the Vehicle Code does not make the violator 
strictly liable for damage caused by the violation. 
[4] Negligence--Nondelegable Duties.-Unlik'e strict liability, a 
nondelegable duty operates, not as a substitute for liability 
based on negligence, but to assure that when the negligently 
caused harm occurs, the injured party will be compensated by 
[1] Automobiles: effect of defecti"e brakes on liability for 
injury, note, 14 A.L.R. 1339, 63 A.L.R. 398, 170 A.L.R. 611. See 
also Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Automobiles, §§ 190, 191 j Am.Jur.2d, Auto-
Iliohiles and Highway Trnfiic, ~ 351. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles and Other Road Ve-
hicles, §§ 108(2), 193(3) j [2] Automobiles and Other Road Ve-
hicles, §§ 108(2), 177, 220; [3] Automobiles and Other Road 
Vehicles, §159(1)j [4] Ncgligence, §2.5; [5] Automobiles and 
Other Road Vehicles, §§ 79(1) (a), 174; [6] Automobiles and 
Other Road Vehicles, §§ 155(1),174. 
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the person whose activity caused the harm and who lJlay 
therefore properly be held liable for the negligence of his 
agent, whether his agent was an employee or an independent 
contractor. 
Automobiles-Opera.tion-Care-Motor Vehicle as Da.ngerous 
Instrumentality: Persons Liable-Acts of Independent Con-
tractors.-A violator of the statutory provisions of the Ve-
hicle Code regulating the maintenance and equipment of 
automobiles is subject to the rule that one who carries on an 
activity which threatens a grave risk of serious bodily harm or 
death unless the instrumentalities used are carefully nlain-
tained, and who employs an independent contractor to main-
tain such instrumentalities, is subject to the same liabilities 
for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor 
in maintaining such instrumentalities as though the employer 
had himself done the work of maintenance. 
Id.-Operation-Care-Violaton of Regulations-Maintenance 
of Equipment: Persons Liable-Acts of Independent Con-
tractors.-A violator of the statutory provisions of the Ve-
hicle Code regulating the maintenance and equipment of auto-
mobiles is subject to the rule that one who by statute or by 
administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specified 
safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to 
liability to the others for whose protection the duty is 
imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor em-
ployed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco and from an order denying 
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Charles 
S. Peery, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for personal injury and property damages arising 
out of an automobile collision. Judgment for defendant re-
versed. 
Morgan & Moscone, Charles O. Morgan, Jr., and George R. 
Moscone for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Gassett, Perry & Katzen and Noel B. Gassett for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff brought this action to recover 
damages for injuries to her person and property incurred in 
an automobile accident. She appeals from an adverse judg-
ment and from an order denying her motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of liability. 
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Plaintiff stopped her ear in a left-turn lane to wait for a 
traffic signal to ehange. Defendant turned into tlle left-turn 
lane behind plaintiff and stepped on her brake pedal. Defend-
ant'8 brakes failed, and a collision ensued. 
Defendant neither knew nor had reason to know that her 
brakes were defective until they failed. The failure was 
caused by a rupture in a hydraulic hose that gave no warning 
to defendant of its impending occurrence. Defendant had the 
brakes completely overhauled by Peter Evanchik of Pete's 
Chevron Station about three months before the accident. 
JJater, about two weeks before the accident, the car was 
involved in another collision, and defendant's husband had 
Evanchik inspect and repair it. Nothing was done to the 
brakes at that time. Defendant's expert witness testified that 
the brakes failed because of a hole in the hydraulic hose tha.t 
was caused by rubbing of the hose against the right front 
wheel. The rubbing resulted from faulty installation of the 
hose at the time the brakes were overhauled. A qualified per-
son inspecting the brakes before they failed would llave 
detected the faulty installation and the evidence of the 
rubbing. 
At the time of the accident section 26300 of the Vehicle 
Code provided that every motor vehicle "shall be equipped 
with brakes adequate to control the movement of the vehicle 
and to stop and hold the vehicle," and section 26453 pro-
vidcd that all "Brakes and eomponent parts thereof shall be 
maint.ained ... in good working order." (See also Veh. 
Code, § 26454.) [la] A defendant's failure to comply with 
these provisions gives rise to a presumption of negligence tllat 
he may rebut by proof "that he did what might reasonably be 
expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under simi-
lar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law." 
(Alarid v. Vanier (1958) 50 Cal.2d 617, 624 [327 P.2d 897], 
see also cases cited on p. 622; Evid. Code, § 669, added by 
Stats. 1967, ch. 650, § 1.) 
[2a] Defendant offered suffieient evidence to rebut the 
presumption that she was negligent. 'fhe brakes had been 
overhauled three months before the accident; the car was 
inspected for damage and repaired after another accident in 
the interim; and the brakes gave no warning to defendant of 
their impending failure. Moreover, she was not negligent in 
failing to discover the faulty installation of or the growing 
damage to the hose, for those defects would be apparent only 
to a mechanic. 
Plaintiff contends, however, that proof that defendant was 
) 
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not herself negligent should not absolve her from liability for 
the damage caused by the failure of her brakes. She contends 
that the court should reconsider the Alaricl decision and hold 
that a motorist is strictly liable for damage caused by a brake 
failure or hold that the duty to exercise reasonable care to 
maintain adequate brakes is nondelegable. 
[3] We adhere to the holding of the Alarid case that a 
violation of a safety provision of the Vehicle Code does not. 
make the violator strictly liable for damage caused by the 
violation. Vie are aware, however, of the growing dissatisfac-
tion with the law of negligence as an effective and appropriate 
means for governing compensation for the increasingly serious 
harms caused by automobiles. (See Ehrenzweig, Negligence 
Without Fault (1951); Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protec-
tion for the Traffic Victim (1965); Franklin, Replacing Ute 
Negligence Lottery (1967) 53 Va.L.R~v. 774; Keeton, Is 
There a Place for Negligence in Modern Tort Law? (1967) 53 
Va.L.Rev. 886; cf. Urie v. Thompson (1949) 337 U.S. 163, 196 
[93 L.Ed. 1282, 1306, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 11 A.L.R.2d 252] (con-
curring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).) If the problem of fixing 
responsibility under a system of strict liability were liS 
uncomplicated as it seems to be in this case, a court might be 
., tempted to follow the lead of decisions recognizing strict lia-
. bility in other circumstances. (See dissenting opinion of 
Shenk, J., in Alarid v. Vanier, supra, 50 Ca1.2d 617,629.) 
In few cases, however, are the fact.o; likely to be as simple as 
they ·are here. In the next case an accident might be caused by 
the combination of a brake failure and a stoplight failure 
under circumstances that would have permitted effective use 
of an emergency handbrake had the following motorist been 
properly alerted by the stoplight required by the Vehicle 
Code. (Veh. Code, § 24603.) In another case, a pedestrian 
might stumble and fall on a dangerous and defective pave-
ment causing a motorist having the right of way to drive 
across the center line of the highway and strike a speeding 
oncoming car. Who is to be strictly liable to whom in such 
casesY However imperfectly it operates, thelaw of negligence 
allocates the risks and determines who shall or shall not be 
compensated when persons simultaneously engaged in the 
common enterprise of 1l.sing the streets and highways have 
accidents. It does so by'invoking familiar rules with respect 
to the reasonably prudent man, duty, proximate cause, con-
tributory negligence, last clear chance, the effect of statutory 
l violations, and imminent peril. A rule of strict liability would 
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require its own attendant coterie of rules to allocate risk and 
govern compensation among co-users of the streets and high-
ways. 
Unless the ratio decidendi of a decision making an abrupt 
change in the law can point with reasonable certainty to the 
solution of similar cases, it cannot help but create uncertainty 
in the area of its concern. In many situations the problems 
caused by such uncertainty will not outweigh the considera-
tions that dictate change as the appropriate common law 
development. To invoke a rule of strict liability on users of 
the streets and highways, however, without also establishing 
in substantial detail how the new rule should operate would 
only contribute confusion to the automobile accident problem. 
Settlement and claims adjustment procedures would become 
chaotic until the new rules were worked out on a case-by-case 
basis, and' the hardships of delayed compensation would be' 
seriously intensified. Only the Legislature, if it deems it wise 
to do so, can avoid such difficulties by enacting a compre-
hensive plan for the compensation of automobile accident vic-
tims in place of or in addition to the law of negligence. 
[lb] It does not follow, howcver, that the duty to exercise 
reasonable care to maintain brakes so that they comply with 
the provisions of the Vehicle Code can be delegated. This issue 
was not raised or considered in the A.larid case. Although 
there is language in Ponce v. Black (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 
159, 163 [36 Cal.Rptr. 419], suggesting that the duty is at 
least in part nondelegable, we doubt that the court in that 
case was addressing itself to that issue. We believe, however, 
that the law governing nondelegable duties dictates imposing 
such a duty here, 
[4] Unlike strict liability, a nondelegable duty operates, 
not as a substitute for liability based on negligence, but to 
assure that when a negligently caused harm occurs, the in-
jured party will be compensated by the person whose activity 
caused the harm and who may therefore properly be held 
liable for the negligence of his agent, whether his agent was 
an employee or an independent contractor. To the extent that 
recognition of nondelegable duties tends to insure that there 
will be a financially responsible defendant available to com-
pensate for the negligent harms caused by that defendant's 
activity, it ameliorates the need for strict liability to secure 
eompensat.ion. 
We recently reviewed the law of nondelegable duties in 
Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Ca1.2d 245, 250-255 
I 
I 
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[66 Cal.Rptr. 20, 437 P.2d 508], and there is no need to re-
iterate that discussion here. It is enough to point out that we 
have found nondelegable duties in a wide variety of situations 
and have recognized that the rules set forth in the Restate-
ment of Torts with respect to such duties are generally in 
accord with California law. Such duties include those imposed 
by a public authority as a condition of granting a franchise 
(Eli v. Murphy (1952) 39 Cal.2d 598, 599 [248 P.2d 756] ; 
Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 594, 604 
[110 P.2d 1044] ; Kirk v. Santa Barbara Ice Co. (1910) 157 
Cal. 591, 593 [108 P. 509] ; Colgrove v. Smith (1894) 102 Cal. 
220,223-224 [36 P. 411, 27 L.R.A. 590]; Rest.2d Torts (1965) 
§ 428) ; the duty of a condemning agent to protect a severed 
parcel from damage (Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. 
v. Southern Cal. Bldg. & Loan Assn. (1961) 188 CaI.App.2d 
850, 854 [10 Cal.Rptr. 811]) ; the duty of a general contractor 
to construct a building safely (Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co. (1958) 
49 Cal.2d 720, 726-727 [321 P.2d 736]) ; the duty to exercise 
due care when an ". . . independent contractor is employed 
to do work which the employer should recognize as nccessarily 
creating a condition involving an unreasonable risk of bodily 
harm to others unless special precautions are taken" (Cour-
teU v. McEachen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 448, 457 [334 P.2d 870] ; 
Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, supra, 68 Cal.2d 245, 254; Am-
briz v. Petro lane Ltd. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 470, 481 [319 P.2d 1] ; 
Rest.2d Torts (1965) § 416); the duty of landowners to main-
tain their property in a reasonably safe condition (Knell v. 
Morris (1952) 39 Cal.2d 450, 456 [247 P.2d 352] ; Brown v. 
George Pepperdine Foundation (1943) 23 Cal.2d 256 [143 
P.2d 929] ; Rest.2d Torts (1965) § 422) and to comply with 
applicable safety ordinances (Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co. 
(1950) 35 Cal.2d 409, 423 [218 P.2d 17] ; Longway v. McCall 
(1960) 181 Cal. App.2d 723, 731 [5 Cal.Rptr. 818]) ; and the 
duty of employers and suppliers to comply with the safety 
provisions of the Labor Code (Alber v. Owens (1967) 66 Cal. 
2d 790, 792 [59 Cal.Rptr. 117, 427 P.2d 781]; DiMuro v. 
Masterson Trusafe Steel Scaffold Co. (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 
784,792 [14 Cal.Rptr. 551]). 
[5] Section 423 of the Restatement Second of Torts pro-
vides that" One who carries on an activity which threatens a 
grave risk of serious bodily harm or death unless the instru-
mentalities used are carefully ... maintained, and who em-
ploys an independent contractor to ... maintain such 
instrumentalities, is subject to the same liability for physical 
) 
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harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in . . • I 
maintaining such instrumentuliti(>s as though the employer \' 
Jlad himself dOllc the worlt of . . . maintenance." [6] Sec- ~ 
tion 424 provides that" Olle who by statute or by adminis-
trative regulation is under a duty to provide specified safe-
guards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to 
Jiability to the others for whose protection the duty is 
imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor 
employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions. " 
[lc] Both of these sections point to a nondelegable duty 
in this case. The statutory provisions regulating the mainte-
nance and equipment of automobiles constitute express legis-
lative recognition of the fact that improperly maintained 
motor vehicles threaten "a grave risk of serious bodily harm 
or death." The responsibility for minimizing that risk or 
compensating for the failure to do so properly rests with the 
person who owns and operates the vehicle. He is the party 
primarily to be benefited by its use; he selects the contractor 
and is free to insist upon one who is financially responsible __ _ 
and to demand indemnity from him; the cost of his liability 
insurance that distributes the risk is properly attributable to 
bis activities; and the discharge of the duty to exercise rea-
sonable care in the maintenance of his vehicle is of the utmost 
importance to the public. (See Van A.rsdaZe v. Hollinger, 
supra, 68 Ca1.2d 245, 253, and authorities cited.) 
rib] In the present case it is undisputed that the accident 
was caused by a failure of defendant's brakes that resulted 
from her independent contractor's negligence in overhauling 
or in thereafter inspecting the brakes. Since her duty to main-
tain her brakes in compliance with the provisions of the 
Vehicle Code is nondelegable, the fact that the brake failure 
was the result of her independent contractor's negligence is 
no defense. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for judg-
ment notwitllstanding the verdict on the issue of liability are 
reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new 
trial on the issue of damages only. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, 
J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment :lor 
the reasons expressed by Mr. Presiding Justice Molinari in 
the opinion prepared by him for the Court of Appeal in 
Maloney v. Rath (CaI.App.) 65 Cal.Rptr. 386. 
